Private Ernest Laws, (Feltwell), 11th Borders, reported missing 1917

His next of kin was his wife, Martha Ann Laws, nee Ketteringham, of the same address. The couple were married in the Parish Church, Feltwell, on the 16th October 1909. Martha was a spinster prior to the marriage. The couple have had one child, Beatrice Ann, born 30th September 1911. There is a note against both wedding and birth details that these were verified from certificates.

He was posted to the 25th Battalion Middlesex Regiment on the 6th July 1916, (PW 6227). He was then posted on to the 98th Training Battalion on the 1st September 1916, (TR/10/37280). On the 5th January 1917 he was posted to the 11th Battalion Border Regiment, (33424). Ernest landed in France on the same day, so he was probably posted straight from the Depot on arriving in France. He joined up with his Battalion on the 22nd of January. Between the end of March and the middle of July he was treated at various locations for Pleurisy \ N.Y.D, the last part being in a Convalescence Camp, before returning to an Infantry Base Depot at Etaples. He was posted back to the 11th Battalion and rejoined them on the 10th August 1917.

He was initially posted as missing and wounded on the 2nd December 1917 and subsequently assumed to have died on or after that date.

Intriguingly in a note to stores advising the death and giving the address for his effects to be sent to he is referred to as No 34424 Private Ernest Edward Laws MM 11th Bn Border Regiment. There is no other reference to him receiving the Military Medal. As far as I’m aware these medals were not awarded posthumously.

Following his death a pension was awarded for his wife and child.

After the end of the war it was decided to pay a War Gratuity as well as send out Medals. To start the process off for those soldiers who had died, Army Form W.5080 was sent out to the last notified next of kin. The form asked for details of family members who were still alive and the lay-out followed the order of precedence of English Inheritance Law.

Martha signed the form and had it witnessed on either the 27th November or December, 1919 by the Rector of Feltwell, who has the worst handwriting of the two of them! The family were listed as:-
1: Wife of the soldier: Martha Ann Lawes
2: Children of the soldier: Beatrice Annie Laws, born September 30th 1911.
Both were living at Chequers Hill, Feltwell.

3: Father of the Soldier: None
4: Mother of the Soldier: None
5: Brothers of the soldier – full blood.
Robert Laws, aged 45, of No.5 William Street, West Kensington, London.
John Laws, aged 43, of Morley St Peters, Wymondham, Norfolk.
6: Brothers of the soldier: – half blood.
George Henery Walker, aged 23, of High Street, Feltwell
7 & 8: Sisters of the soldier – full blood and half blood.
None.

Tracing father John back to the 1861 census the 7 year old John, born Pickenham, Norfolk, was recorded living in Feltwell with his parents John and Susan, and 4 sibling – one of which was the 1 year old Arthur Laws, born Feltwell. However following that man through he was still unmarried on the 1881 census and so could not have legally been the father of the William Walker Laws born 1880 according to the Peterborough WW1 site.

A further check shows that on the 1881 census the 6 month old William W. Laws, born Feltwell, was recorded living at a dwelling on Cock Street, Feltwell, His parents were Arthur Laws, aged 25 and a Millers Labourer, born Fincham, Norfolk, and Ann E, aged 25 and born Feltwell. Their other children are a 4 year old John and a 2 year old Fredk W – both born Feltwell. Still living on Cock Street on the 1891 census, the couple by then had 9 children, but none was an Ernest or an Edward.

Certainly as far as the Ernest who died and the William who served with the ASC, they were not brothers, and at least through their fathers sides weren’t even cousins. There may be a more distant familial relationship but sadly that would take more time to unravel than I could afford to spend.

Wurst Farm: – After resting all day the Batt. moved from WURST FARM at 8.55 and took up forming up positions on The [?] prior to the attack.

2.12.17 – Battalion War Diary

Westroosebeek area: – The Battalion made a night attack on the German positions South of WESTROOSEBEEK in conjunction with remaining units of 97th Infantry Bde and 2 units of the 96th Infantry Bde. Zero hour 1.55am. The battalion took its objectives but the two leapfrogging Coys fell back before dawn onto subsidiary objectives which were held all day until the enemy launched a counter attack at 4.30pm and the battalion fell back onto the old line.

3.12.17 – Battalion War Diary

The Night action of 1/2 December 1917 during the First World War, was a local operation on the Western Front, in Belgium at the Ypres Salient. The British Fourth Army (re-named from the Second Army on 8 November) attacked the German 4th Army. The Third Battle of Ypres (31 July – 10 November) proper had ended officially on 20 November but the attack was intended to capture the heads of valleys leading eastwards from the ridge, to gain observation over German positions.

On 18 November the VIII Corps on the right and II Corps on the left (northern) side of the Passchendaele Salient took over from the Canadian Corps. The area was subjected to constant German artillery bombardments and its vulnerability to attack led to a suggestion by Brigadier C. F. Aspinall that, either the British should retire to the west side of the Gheluvelt Plateau or advance to broaden the salient towards Westroosebeke. Expanding the salient would make the troops in it less vulnerable to German artillery-fire and provide a better jumping off line for a resumption of the offensive in the spring of 1918.

The British attacked towards Westroozebeke on the night of 1/2 December but the plan to mislead the Germans by not bombarding the German defences until eight minutes after the infantry began their advance came undone. The noise of the British assembly and the difficulty of moving across muddy and waterlogged ground had also alerted the Germans. In the moonlight, the Germans had seen the British troops when they were still 200 yd (180 m) away. Some ground was captured and about 150 prisoners were taken but the attack on the redoubts failed and observation over the heads of the valleys on the east and north sides of the ridge had not been gained.

Strategic developments

With the failure to capture Passchendaele and the ridge on 12 October, the grand strategic objectives of the Third Battle of Ypres were abandoned; attacks continued to secure a winter line from Passchendaele to Westroosebeke (now Westrozebeke), to hold German troops in Flanders before a British offensive at Cambrai due on 20 November and to provide jumping-off points for a resumption of the offensive in 1918. On 20 November 1917, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) officially ended the battle. Haig took the decision because of an acute shortage of infantry, orders to send five divisions to Italy in the British Expeditionary Force (Italy) and the need to take over more of the Western Front from the French. Command of the former Second Army sector in Flanders was transferred to General Henry Rawlinson and the Fourth Army HQ, which also took over command of II Corps (Lieutenant-General Claud Jacob). General Hubert Gough and the Fifth Army headquarters were transferred to Artois in command of the divisions relieving French divisions south of the Somme. It was desirable for the Fourth Army to mount minor operations to improve its positions and to continue to keep German troops away from Cambrai, once the Battle of Cambrai (20 November – 7 December 1917) had begun

Second Battle of Passchendaele

After the Canadian Corps attacks of 26 and 30 October and the capture of Passchendaele village on 6 November, the crossroads and remaining high ground near Hill 52 to the north were attacked on 10 November. The junction was 1,000 yd (910 m) north on the Passchendaele–Westroosebeke road and Hill 52 was 500 yd (460 m) beyond. Capture of the features would give the Second Army observation over German positions to the north-east. The Germans had used the lull after 6 November relieve the 11th Division with the 4th Division and the 44th Reserve Division. The Canadian attack jumped-off from Mosselmarkt, the crossroads was captured and Venture Farm was overrun. In the II Corps area to the north, the advance by the 1st Division was foiled, when one of its two attacking battalions lost direction; a German counter-attack got between them and forced the survivors back to their start lines. Canadian troops filled the gap and threw back a defensive flank along the corps boundary but this ended the Canadian advance. The Second Army was still short of Westrosebeek, from which the Germans had observation over the Passchendaele Salient. In the Fifth Army area, the XIV Corps had been relieved by XIX Corps on 29 October, II Corps took over from XVIII Corps on 2 November and on 14 November, VIII Corps in the Second Army area began the relief of the Canadian Corps.

Passchendaele salient

The British salient was about 3,000 yd (2,700 m) deep, 1,000 yd (910 m) wide and was overlooked from German positions at Westroosebeke to the north, the highest point on Passchendaele Ridge.

In early November there was one duckboard track into the area, easily visible to German observers and under frequent bombardment. Roads from Broodseinde and Zonnebeke were also shelled, a soldier who tried to detour over open ground, could disappear in the mud or blunder into German positions. German artillery observers directed constant shell and gas bombardments and when the 33rd Division took over from the 3rd Canadian Division on 6 November, the only places proof against German shells were captured pillboxes and blockhouses. The locations of these structures were obvious to the Germans, who continuously bombarded them with gas shell, making them near uninhabitable.

The original British plan was to continue the offensive to capture Westroosebeke; to defeat a German counter-attack the ridge was strongly garrisoned.

British preparations

By 18 November, the II Corps held the northern part and the VIII Corps held the south side of the salient. Brigadier-General C. F. Aspinall, the Brigadier-General General Staff (BGGS) of VIII Corps, wrote a report describing the vulnerability of the position and its approaches to German artillery. Aspinall estimated that repairing the transport routes and keeping them open despite German bombardments, would take eight labour battalions when VIII Corps had only three. Aspinall considered that the morale effect of holding the village after such an effort by both sides was considerable, that parts of the rear area were shielded from German observers and it would be a good jumping-off position for an offensive towards Westroosebeke or the Lys valley but that its positions lacked observation to the north and north-east. Remaining in the salient would mean that the Germans could continue bombard the defenders from an arc of 240°, reinforcements had no cover and supplies had to be carried forward a great distance. It would be easy for the Germans to prevent troops moving into the salient and they could smother the area with artillery-fire, guaranteeing a constant drain of casualties. Because the salient needed an excessive amount of artillery, the crews would have little rest, being so vulnerable to flanking-fire and the infantry holding the area would be too worn out to fight in a spring offensive. Aspinall recommended that unless there was another offensive in early 1918, the British should withdraw about 8,000 yd (7,300 m), to a line from Westhoek along Pilckem Ridge to the north. A retirement should not be delayed until a German attack, because much of the artillery would be lost but rather be a surprise as soon as the new front line was ready. Despite the gloomy prognosis, Rawlinson decided that the army should remain on the ridge. Teall Cottage was captured on the night of 21/22 November and on the night of 24/25 November two battalions of the 8th Division attacked without artillery support and advanced the line to the ridge crest, which increased the depth of observation into the German lines by 400 yd (370 m). A German counter-attack on the 8th Division front at 6:00 a.m. on 30 November was anticipated and was repulsed, with many German casualties inflicted by British small-arms fire and a prompt artillery barrage. Teall Cottage, having been transferred from the 8th Division to the 32nd Division area on 24/25 November, was recaptured and a British counter-attack on the cottage before dawn on 1 December failed, with 102 casualties.

British plan

VIII Corps held the right flank of the salient with the 33rd Division on the right and the 8th Division the centre; II Corps held the left flank with the 32nd Division. At a conference on 18 November, Rawlinson told Jacob, Hunter-Weston and Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie (Canadian Corps), that an operation to take the ground along the ridge as far as Westroosebeke was to be undertaken, to broaden the salient. Success would give the British observation over valleys on the north and east sides of the ridge and deprive the Germans of assembly areas on the reverse slope. Planning began for a methodical advance to broaden the salient from Passchendaele to Westroosebeke and Spriet. The 8th Division was to conduct an attack on 26 November to advance 100–300 yd (91–274 m) eastwards on a 1,020 yd (930 m) front and the 32nd Division was to act as a flank guard by advancing for 400 yd (370 m) on the flanks and 700 yd (640 m) in the centre, on a 1,850 yd (1,690 m) front from the north edge of the salient. The 35th Division to the north was to support the 32nd Division with machine-gun fire.

32nd Division

The 97th Brigade and the 15th Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers (15th LF) of the 96th Brigade formed up below the faint outline of Hill 52 and the low southern slope of Vat Cottage Ridge. The 2nd Battalion, King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (2nd KOYLI) was on the right flank with three companies for the attack and one in support, 16th Battalion, Highland Light Infantry to its left, then the 11th Battalion, Border Regiment (11th Border) and 17th Battalion, Highland Light Infantry (17th HLI), each with two companies leading and two in support and 15th LF on the left flank (which had been holding the line with 16th Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers (16th NF) since the night of 30 November/1 December) with three assault companies and one in support, on a 1,850 yd (1,690 m) front from Teall Cottage to the north-east of Tournant Farm. The 16th NF retired to the right of Virile Farm in reserve after being relieved; patrols and Lewis gun crews entered no man’s land after dark to cover the assembly. The battalions formed four waves, the first two in skirmish lines forming an advanced guard and the other two in section columns (snake formation), to advance through the crater field and be ready to outflank the objectives.

Advancing at 1:55 a.m., the 97th Brigade suffered many casualties amongst junior officers and NCOs; after seizing Hill 52 and Mallet Copse the advance was stopped by german resistance. German counter-attacks during the morning and late afternoon drove back the tired survivors to positions just short of or on the jumping-off line. Shute requested permission to attack again with the 14th Brigade (Brigadier-General Frederick William Lumsden) was refused by British GHQ on the morning of 3 December.

Analysis

In his 1979 memoir The Anger of the Guns, John Nettleton, the former Intelligence Officer for the 2nd Battalion, Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort’s Own), wrote that in conditions where the moon was near full, there was no cover and the troops would stumble forward, rather than overrun the German defences. Objections to the plan were passed on by the 8th Division battalion, brigade and division commanders
…hostile machine-gun fire from prepared positions on a bright moonlight night was more to be feared than any barrage.
— Major-General W. C. G. Heneker, GOC 8th Division
but Heneker was over-ruled. Everything went wrong from the start; no-one thought that the attack could succeed and morale was depressed. It appeared that the Germans realised that an attack was imminent the night before, when the Royal Engineers went forward to mark the jumping-off lines for the attack. There was only one decent road for the 32nd Division and a duckboard track for the 25th Brigade, 8th Division, to reach their assembly positions. German artillery was registered on these approach routes and inflicted many casualties as the troops moved up. The track was on the right side of the 8th Division and the troops using it had to move from right to left to assemble along the tapes. The moon was bright and the Germans could not but notice three battalions lining up behind the British outpost line.

As liaison officer to the 32nd Division, Nettleton moved up along the road and wrote that if the Germans were still ignorant of British intentions, a soldier carrying a sack of very lights was hit by a bullet which set them off. The troops nearby rolled him in the mud but could not extinguish the flares. The 32nd Division was supposed to have captured the Teall Cottage pillbox two days previous but the troops found that it was still occupied by Germans. The cottage was at a right angle in the front line and the attacking lines of both divisions could be enfiladed by machine-gun fires from the pillbox. The 32nd Division companies assembled in echelon to the left of Teall Cottage; runners from the Royal Irish Rifles drank the run ration and the battalion commander had to cadge replacements from the 25th Brigade. From the battalion HQ, Nettleton heard the German machine-guns begin to fire at 1:55 a.m. as soon the advance began. The artillery barrage that began eight minutes later was "magnificent" but the attack had already been defeated, the German machine-gunners having "wiped out" the British infantry in the moonlight. The 2nd KOYLI managed to advance only 100 yd (91 m) and when it was relieved on the night of 2/3 December, it had the appearance of an understrength company